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Jason Tougaw 
The Self Is a Moving Target: 
The Neuroscience of Siri Hustvedt's Artists 
[ ... ] there is a coherent foundational process, or "self representation," that does not observe 
in the conventional sense but is observed or at least strongly "intermeshed" with various 
higher perceptual processes. In other words, the self·schema provides input into many sen-
sory analyzers, and it is also strongly influenced by the primal emotional circuits[ ... ) These 
interactions may constitute affective consciousness. 
- Jaak Panksepp (1999: 309) 
Ekphrasis - the literary descripton of visual art - would appear to have little to 
do with theoretical neuroscience. But in Siri Hustvedt's novels, she represents 
painting and other visual arts to ask many of the same questions about the 
meaning of selfhood that animate her interest in neuroscience, psychology, 
and the philosophy of mind. All of Hustvedt's novels portray artists interested 
in representing the self - with varying degrees of villainy - and her descriptions 
of their work belong to the venerable history of ekphrasis: Achilles' shield in 
Homer's The Iliad, the frescoes in Cervantes' Don Quixote, the Grecian urn in 
Keats, the masterpiece in Zola, Dorian Gray's portrait in Wilde, Icarus falling 
in Auden, The Goldfinch in Donna Tartt. Unlike most of these fictional artworks, 
Hustvedt's tend to be contiguous with forms of "self representation" our brains 
engage in. 
It's rare enough for a writer to employ ekphrasis so routinely and even rarer 
for a novelist to describe entire collections or exhibitions of visual art, as Hust-
vedt does in several of her novels. In Siri Hustvedt's novels, ekphrasis is central 
to the development of mystery plots whose resolutions require more than the 
solving of crimes or the revelation of secrets. They require characters to confront 
Hustvedt's primary preoccupations - with the relations between minds, bodies, 
identities, and felt, unfelt, and barely felt subjective experience. Visual art - and 
especially portraits - is one of Hustvedt's vehicles for dramatizing thorny ques-
tions about what it feels like to be human. When her artists are villains, it is be-
cause they abuse their power to fix or exploit identity through representation. 
Neuropsychologist Jaak Panksepp (a colleague and friend of Hustvedt's) de-
scribes "affective consciousness" - the feeling of having a self - as a product 
of an organism's experience of the full range of emotions, felt and unfelt , "inter-
meshed" (or mixed) with "higher perceptual processes" and "strongly influenced 
by the primal emotional circuits" (1999: 309). Hustvedt's artists tend to invite 
brainy characters struggling with primal emotions to sit for them. Their portraits 
tend to reveal the flux of experience that makes identity. They also tend to pro-
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voke identity crises, rooted in the subjects' discomfort with what is revealed in 
the portraits. What is revealed has everything to with proposals about the phys-
iology of self in the work of neuroscientists - for example, Panksepp's argument 
about relationships between "primal emotions" and cognition, Damasio's theory 
about consciousness arising from the brain's mapping of the body's basic func-
tions, or Solms' demonstration of how the psychoanalytic and neurological 
minds may be reconciled. In Hustvedt, ekphrasis becomes a vehicle for exploring 
the interpersonal implications of hypotheses like the ones they propose. 
Hustvedt nestles a joke into The Blazing World (2014) that hints at the con-
nection between art and neuroscience. Her artist-protagonist Harriet Burden 
places Hustvedt at the end of a lengthy list of writers and thinkers who have the-
orized the relationship between mind, body, and self: "[ ... ] and an obscure nov-
elist and essayist, Siri Hustvedt, whose position Burden calls a 'moving target"' 
(254). The joke signals Hustvedt's stance. She is insistent on the inconsistencies 
that define her dramatization of identity. Hustvedt's writing is about moving tar-
gets, about the framing and reframing that makes selfhood intelligible. Her writ-
ing - fiction and nonfiction - invites readers to step into the various frames, to 
try on points of view. If there is a crime in Hustvedt's fiction, it is nearly always 
tied to a criminal who clings too rabidly to a philosophical position, refusing or 
unable to be influenced by other points of view. These crimes nearly always in-
volve works of art, and they tend to yoke questions about mind and body, rep-
resentation, and barely felt experience. Collectively, the crimes and misdemean-
ors of Hustvedt's artist characters become an index of the philosophical 
positions she dramatizes. 
Hustvedt's joke works through a form of double ventriloquism. The joke ap-
pears in an essay attributed to art critic Richard Brickman, a persona adopted by 
Harriet Burden, who publishes philosophical essays in academic journals using 
the pseudonym. In other words, the joke is a product of mixing personae. Siri 
Hustvedt is Richard Brickman, who is Harriet Burden, philosophizing about 
the relationship of the work of Siri Hustvedt to a lineage of philosophers and 
neuroscientists making arguments about the mind, body, and self. Brickman's 
tone is downright severe; Burden's position is playful, in the sense that she is 
playing a trick on her academic audience, but her remark is earnest. To get 
the joke, you have to be in on the levels of ventriloquism that mix the points 
of view. Hustvedt's position is a moving target because her method is to dram-
atize gaps and questions in response to a history of arguments and propositions. 
Taking too furn a position would make her like one of her artist criminals.
1 
-1 A firm position would also make Hustvedt an author of didactic fiction, designed to instruct 
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One way to trace the "moving target" of Hustvedt's position is to examine 
the portrait artists who reappear in all of Hustvedt's six published novels. A sig-
nificant number of these artists are in the business of exploiting others through 
portraiture - almost a kind of soul stealing, whereby the artists capture some un-
nerving image of their subjects, an image that reveals some degree of instability 
in their identities. Hustvedt is interested in revealing these instabilities, but her 
narratives condemn their exploitation, which generally involves a fixing of unsta-
ble moments, through which a marginal aspect of the subject's identity becomes 
a public replacement for the person who posed for the portrait. 
As Christine Marks argues in her book "I am because you are": Relationality 
in the Works of Siri Hustvedt (2014), "Hustvedt's work exhibits the inevitable in-
terrelatedness of the human experience while advocating self-other relations 
based on dialogical intersubjectivity" (2). Marks identifies a lineage of modem 
thinkers whose theories about "self-other relations" reverberate through Hust-
vedt's fiction like moving targets, including Hegel, Lacan, Winnicott, and Mer-
leau-Ponty. Marks's choice of verbs captures key qualities of Hustvedt's narrative 
style. In her novels, she exhibits ideas about the self that she explores in her es-
says, where she advocates what Marks calls "a philosophy of mixing" - articu-
lated explicitly by the character Violet in What I Loved: "mixing is the way of 
the world. The world passes through us - food, books, pictures, other people" 
(88). Exhibition is a recurring theme in the novels. Hustvedt's artists capture 
and exhibit portraits of her other characters, who respond with varying degrees 
of discomfort to finding images of themselves fixed, framed, and displayed for 
others. The discomfort arises from a tension that emerges from portraiture. Artist 
and subject mix in the process of creating images, but the subjects end up feel-
ing exploited through the artists' denials of the mixing. The denials leave the 
subjects feeling exposed during moments when the world is passing through 
them. 
In Hustvedt's first novel, The Blindfold (1992), the artist, a photographer 
named George, seduces Iris (famously, an anagram for Siri), into posing for 
him. Unnerved by the results, Iris accuses George of stealing her soul: 
rather than to catalyze the kinds of subjective experience she writes about. David Brooks's The 
Social Animal: The Hidden Sources of Love, Character, and Achievement is a useful foil for 
Hustvedt's fiction. The "hidden sources" in Brooks's fictional thought experiment lie in the 
unconscious work of the mind·brain. Unlike Hustvedt, Brooks's position is a stable target - the 
unconscious is the creative, social force of cognitive neuroscience, not the roiling menace of 
psychoanalysis - and his prose plodding. 
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"You robbed me." I didn't know what the words meant, but they seemed to identify an 
amorphous truth. 
He looked at me squarely. "You came here. I photographed you. You came because you 
wanted to come." 
I stopped breathing. He was right. (78) 
Iris is not sure why the print upsets her, but she knows she does not want it ex-
hibited. The evidence is in her body. When Iris stops breathing, Hustvedt invites 
readers to imagine the interruption of her breath - to imagine George's power 
over Iris's autonomic nervous system. Her embodied experience becomes the evi-
dence of his violation and her complicity. Iris wanted to be fixed, and George ma-
nipulated her. The only resolution to their debate is to acknowledge both truths. 
Nonetheless, George is the villain. He uses the portrait to instigate social contro-
versy and to hurt her so he can witnes: her in a. st~te of.pain. O~tri~h.t ma~i~u­
lation trumps a little unconscious desire for ob1ectificatlon. In his d1alog1c m-
tersubjective" relationships, George wields power through his position as 
witness and distributor, the one who controls who mixes with whom and how. 
1. The Artists 
Most of Hustvedt's artists are portraitists of one kind or another. They work in a 
range of media; some are obsessive, others nearly deranged, some malicious, 
some ruthless, others merely eccentric. They share a devotion to visual repre~en­
tation that overshadows decorum. They flout conventional attitudes about pnva-
cy, devote themselves to craft at the expense of intimate relationships, a~d they 
document what others don't want to see. While they are all interested m chal-
lenging cultural and aesthetic convention, their ethical stances - about the rela-
tionship between art and life or the portrait and the person - vary enormo~sly. 
Their ethical positions become legible through their attitudes about frammg. 
They all know that visual composition is powerful because it endows images 
with meaning. They all enjoy the power to manipulate the meanings of images. 
They all know that a portrait is a creative distortion. Their portraits frame the 
"dialogical intersubjectivity" (2014: 2) Christine Marks traces in Hustvedt's fic-
tion. Portraits frame the mixing of artist, subject, and viewer. Reading about 
Hustvedt's portraits is almost like climbing into this frame to muck around 
with the materials that shape the encounters they engender. She judges her por-
traitists according to their ethical relationship to the mixing they provoke. 
The artists who exploit portraiture's power to fix their subjects - including 
The Blindfold's George, What I Loved's Teddy Giles, The Sorrows of an American's 
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Jeffrey Lane, and The Blazing World's Rune - are outright villains. Those who ex-
periment with visual forms that foreground unseen or unrepresentable qualities 
of their subjects' experience - including The Enchantment of Lily Dahl's Edward 
Shapiro, What I Loved's Bill Wechsler, The Summer without Men's Abigail, and 
The Blazing World's Harriet Burden - are difficult people who struggle with suc-
cess at forming mutually rewarding social relationships. The Enchantment of Lily 
Dahl's Martin Petersen is in a category of his own. Deranged by his obsession 
with the image's power to distort reality, Petersen's work becomes evidence of 
crime and mental instability, yet his collages and life-size doll project share 
many of the aesthetic hallmarks of Hustvedt's other artists, especially the em-
phasis on the ironic relationship between the artist's materials and the subject's 
experience. 
Portraits represent living bodies inhabiting physical space - in Hustvedt, 
apartments and streets, mostly - but they also represent the immaterial experi-
ence of those living bodies and the relationship between artist and subject. In 
that sense, portraiture is a vehicle for exploring elements of selfhood uncannily 
similar to the ones that comprise the theory of self and consciousness proposed 
by Antonio R. Damasio, with whom Hustvedt has engaged in an ongoing public 
dialogue about their shared preoccupations. Damasio's theory of consciousness 
hinges on the dynamic relationship between "organisms" and "objects," a rela-
tionship that produces the mental "images" that comprise subjective experience 
(1999: 11). Damasio's model shares a great deal with Panksepp's. Both identify 
what Damasio calls "primordial feelings" (echoing Panksepp) as a foundation 
for both self and consciousness. In Damasio's words, these are "the elementary 
feelings of existence that spring spontaneously" from our brains' constant map-
ping of the changing states of our bodies (2010: 24). Damasio acknowledges what 
philosophers call an "explanatory gap" concerning bodies and the feelings that 
animate them. Hustvedt's artists explore or exploit this gap. In a sense, her nov-
els are about the ethics of visual representation focused on how the artist's tools 
- paint, camera, plastic, clay - make new objects from selves. Damasio's argu-
ment suggests that objectification is fundamental to consciousness. We become 
who we are through our relationships with the objects in our worlds. As Christine 
Marks observes, Merleau-Ponty conceptualized self and other as "a union which 
transcends the distinction between subject and object and allows for intersubjec-
tive harmony" (2014: 57). That's the ideal, but as Marks acknowledges, it can go 
wrong. If relations are not reciprocal, the result can be "cleavage," "loss of sub-
jectivity," and even "annihilation." In Hustvedt's fiction, the relationship be-
tween artists and their subjects is fraught with the ethics of reciprocity implied 
in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the self. The artists document objectification, 
and her novels dramatize the ethical questions that ensue: What does the new 
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object - the portrait - do to its subject? Does it foster union or catalyze annihi-
lation? Might it transform the psyche of the subject? Is it the artist's responsibil-
ity to care? 
Hustvedt doesn't answer these questions in her novels. Instead, she drama-
tizes the ethics of visual representation - which she explores in more concrete 
terms in her essays. In The Blindfold (1992), George persuades Iris to pose. She 
objects to the photograph, taken while she danced around his apartment in a 
frenzy, because it seems to represent her as "a face without reason" (63). The 
photograph circulates around New York City with a kind of talismanic force, 
gaining a social life of its own as its subject goes into a kind of peripatetic hid-
ing. In The Enchantment of Lily Dahl (1996), two portraitists propel the epony-
mous heroine's confrontations with reality, perception, and illusion. Edward 
Shapiro, a New York artist visiting the small town where Lily was raised, be-
comes her lover - and drives her to jealousy when he paints her elderly neighbor 
while local misfit Martin Petersen builds a life-size doll of Lily. In What I Loved 
(2003), Bill Wechsler's paintings propel plot. The novel opens with narrator Leo 
Hertzberg's description of a portrait of a woman lying on the floor, haunted by 
the shadow of the artist and the foot and ankle of a woman apparently walking 
out of the frame. The second painting is a portrait of Mark, as the two-year-old 
son of Wechsler's friends and neighbors. When Mark becomes a teenager with a 
severe case of empathy disorder, he befriends enfant terrible artist Teddy Giles, 
who steals the portrait and exhibits it - torn and slashed - as his own work 
of metacommentary on the art world. In The Sorrows of an American (2008), pro-
tagonist Erik Davidsen develops a case of unrequited love for a neighbor whose 
estranged husband, Jeffrey Lane, is a controversial photographer. Lane photo-
graphs his daughter and her mother secretly, breaks into Davidsen's apartment, 
and photographs him in a state of uncontrolled rage - exhibiting the portrait 
without his permission. In The Summer without Men (2011), the elderly Abigail 
bewilders the novel's heroine and narrator, Mia Fredericksen, with her sinister 
"amusements" - works of needlepoint planted with secret buttons that open 
upon sinister worlds that seem to represent her community's history of sexual 
violence. In The Blazing World (2014), Harriet Burden, a giant, loquacious auto-
didact of an artist, hires successively three men to exhibit her works as their 
own, including her various versions of her "metamorphs" - three dimensional 
portraits of humanity's abject or liminal experience. In the end, the art scammer 
is scammed by her more ruthless peer, Rune, who taunts her with a video of her 
dead husband and seduces her into revealing a video portrait of her own antics, 
whereby the two artists don masks and play a sadomasochistic game. If there is 
an ethical undercurrent shared by these novels, it goes something like this: 
Human beings will represent the world and objectify each other in the process. 
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We should be careful about the process and the results. But the dynamics of ob-
jectification vary with relationships, so there is no singular ethical stance to 
guide us. It is all in the details - and the relations. 
If The Blindfold inaugurates Hustvedt's use of portraits to propel plot, The 
Blazing World, her latest novel, complicates the narrative role of the portrait in 
too many ways to trace. Early in The Blindfold, Iris and George witness a 
woman undone by an epileptic seizure on a city street. George swears and fum-
bles in a failed attempt to get a shot of the suffering woman. Afterwards, he and 
Iris argue about the ethics of portraiture after she annoys him by suggesting 
"maybe it was for the best": 
"Why?" said Stephen. He sounded annoyed. 
"Well, because it would be terrible for her if she knew, and it seems so invasive, re-
cording a person's suffering." 
"You really believe that there are subjects that shouldn't be photographed?" George 
said. He spoke evenly and softly. 
"Maybe I do," I said, thinking aloud. (49) 
Maybe. George interprets Iris's uncertainty as weakness. But he cannot see what 
he cannot see. An epileptic seizure represents the kind of experience - primor-
dial feelings - that haunts a portrait. It is powerful and disabling, but it is also 
inarticulate. It marks a person, but that person cannot remember what hap-
pened. Put another way, the phenomenology of experience holds a spectral re-
lationship to the portrait (a relationship Oscar Wilde dramatizes ingeniously in 
The Portrait of Dorian Gray). 
When Iris poses for George, the scene is a staged re-enactment of the seizure 
episode, with Iris cast in the part of the epileptic: 
It doesn't matter, I said to myself. Maybe that thought was the break, the change I willed in 
myself without knowing why. The pace quickened. I heard myself laugh. We found a 
rhythm. George moved from side to side. He squatted, s tood, knelt, and I moved with 
him. He laughed, and I danced, carefully at first, aware of my arms and legs, my waist 
and hips, seeing myself as in a mirror, but then I forgot myself and moved faster and faster. 
I gyrated and spun like a lunatic for George, who shouted encouragements and took what 
seemed like hundreds of pictures, stopping only to put more film in the camera. My feet 
pounded the floor. l made noise, slapping my thighs, beating a chair with my hands, 
and hooting with an exuberance that made me dizzy. My heart raced. I don't know how 
long it went on, but I remember panting from the effort, feeling the sweat in my hair 
and under my arms, and finally bending over in exhaustion. I looked at George. He grinned. 
He was sitting on the floor with his camera in his lap. I knelt down and crawled toward 
him, looking at his lean arms and beautiful mouth. I lifted my right arm and extended 
my hand toward his face, but something in his expression stopped me. I have what I 
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want, it seemed to say. Don't come any closer. I dropped my arm and sat back, still breath-
ing hard. (54- 55) 
Iris performs like one of Charcot's nineteenth-century hysterics, willed by a man 
into a frenzy of feeling whose physicality and irrationality contrast starkly with 
her ordinary behavior and identity. She hears herself laugh; she slaps her thighs; 
she hoots; becomes dizzy and sweats. George grins, because he has gotten what 
he wanted: an image that seems to capture the interstices of Iris Vegan's com-
posed public identity. His mistake is that he believes the performance is more 
real than Iris's public self, that unconscious or physical expression are more re-
vealing than public behavior governed by social decorum_ 
In Hustvedt's fictional worlds, it is usually a mistake to believe in one form 
of experience at the expense of another_ When Iris sees the photo George selects 
and prints, she is startled by the way it forces her to confront herself: 
At first I didn't recognize myself. The person in the picture seemed to bear no resemblance 
to me, and for an instant I thought George had made a mistake, had given me the wrong 
photo, but then I saw myself, and I had a peculiar sensation of recovery, of remembering a 
forgotten event, something unpleasant and disorienting. I tried to catch it, but it was like a 
fragment of a dream that surfaces for a moment during the day, brought forth by a sight or 
sound, and then retreats - as quickly as it came - into unconsciousness. I put the picture 
down on the table but picked it up again. (62) 
What does it mean that light projected onto paper, or paint, or plastics, or words 
can represent fragments of experience that "surfaces for a moment [ ... ] then re-
treats - as quickly as it came"? How should we respond when forgotten experi-
ence or alien aspects of our identities are fixed or objectified in art? These are 
questions that remain alive throughout all Hustvedt's fiction. 
If George's photograph suggests these questions indirectly, Harriet Burden 
addresses them directly in her work. She makes portraits in the form of three-di· 
mensional metamorphs, whose bodies come in a variety of temperatures. She de-
scribes them as "the creatures that lived in my memory, not only actual persons, 
but those borrowed from my vast collection of books. I don't mean just charac· 
ters but ideas, voices, shapes, figures, articulated thoughts, unarticulated feel· 
ings" (2014: 30). Burden extends and blurs the portrait, plays with its capacity 
to represent something like what Damasio calls "primordial feelings" (2010: 
11). Her metamorphs suggest that aspects of self that cannot be seen can none-
theless be manipulated through portraiture, because what you do see makes you 
think about what you cannot. 
Hustvedt endows Harriet Burden with many of her own philosophical posi· 
tions - particularly the identity mixing that is so central to both her fiction and 
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nonfiction. "We are all a menage," Harriet states (2014: 230). As the two artists 
initiate their collaboration, she elaborates: 
And, Harry asked, where does it begin? The thoughts, words, joys, and fears of other people 
enter us and become ours. They live in us from the start. Moral panic, the multiple-person· 
ality epidemic, and recovered-memory mania ran wild in the eighties and early nineties as 
a wave of suggestion passed from one person to another, a kind of mass hypnosis or 
spreading unconscious permission that allowed countless people to suddenly become a 
man, a Pandora's box. Therapists reported on patients with dozens of personalities. 
Whole populations housed inside a single body - men, women, and children coming out 
as alters. What did it mean? And then when the name of the illness was changed to Disso-
ciative Identity Disorder and skepticism reasserted itself, the numbers of people diagnosed 
with the illness diminished to a few cases here and there. What Harry wanted to know was: 
Were we just one person or were we all many? (326-337) 
But Harry is a mess. She allows herself to be duped by a sociopathic charlatan 
with a shallow interest in philosophy and a fixation with provoking a limited 
range of feelings in his work - mainly shock, terror, and envy. She may be a 
mess because she cannot resist provoking the populations housed in her body 
into savage warfare. She cannot resist making herself an experiment. 
Burden's metamorphs are experimental portraits in three dimensions. They 
free their subjects of conventional frames. Her multiple narrators describe 
them from their own points of view, generally documenting their ambivalence 
to the uncanny creatures. She exhibits them in a show entitled The Suffocation 
Rooms under the name Phineas Q. Eldridge, one of her lodgers - a drag 
queen and performance artist whose experiments with mutable identity meld 
well with her ethos. In Eldridge's words, 
When I arrived at the lodge, Harry was tending to her own characters, a group of stuffed 
figures - cold, coolish, warm, and hot. I became fond of her "metamorphs" (as Harry called 
them), even though a good number of them were injured or deformed. I take that back. I 
liked the hurt metamorphs most, the ones with missing legs and arms, with braces and 
slings, humps, or rashes painted on them. They did not look real, but they felt more 
human than a lot of humans I know, and Harry was gentle with her homemade critters. 
(117- 118) 
Burden "tends" her metamorphs - like you would an infant or a farm animal. 
Eldridge calls them "homemade critters." The metamorphs are humanoid, de· 
signed to call attention to the fact that a human is an organism, a species of 
mammal. Their injuries and deformities are reminders that there is no norm or 
absolute when it comes to human bodies. They do not look like "real" humans, 
because a portrait is not a real human. But to Eldridge they "felt more human 
than a lot of humans" (italics mine). Notice the wily slip from "real" to 
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"human" here. Eldridge uses the two words like synonyms, but there is always a 
subtle difference in meaning between words that mean almost the same thing. 
Burden's metamorphs challenge the idea that we can access another person's re· 
ality. Instead, they emphasize feeling. It is more important that her critters feel 
human. Eldridge's "a lot" is a subtle addition to what amounts to a kind of 
code for reading the metamorphs. A lot of humans do not feel real to him, but 
this means that others do. Burden's critters land somewhere between those 
who feel real to him and those who do not. They disturb binary responses be· 
tween art and subject. Some art feels more human than humans; some humans 
feel more human than others; some humans feel less human than art. 
The Suffocation Rooms consists of a series of rooms, each a little wanner 
than the last, amplifying the metamorphs' peculiar range of body temperatures. 
Burden has placed critters made from beeswax in boxes, "trying to get out," and 
populated the rooms with other metamorphs, who grow larger as visitors walk 
from one room to the next (125). In Eldridge's words, "The metamorphs were 
big, goofy-looking, lumpy things, who sat at their tables in all seven rooms" 
(125). The seventh room is the warmest and most startling: 
Because she did want the person to look like an alien in some 1950s sci·fi film, the model 
became more and more realistic: skinny, eerily transparent (liver, heart, stomach, and in· 
testines just barely visible), hermaphroditic (small breast buds and not-yet-grown penis), 
frizzy red human hair. The creature is strangely beautiful, and when you see him/her in 
the seventh room out of the box, s tanding on a stool to look out the window, or rather 
into the mirror, you can't help feeling touched somehow. The really large (by now) meta· 
morphs have finally noticed that the personage is out and have turned their heads to 
look at it. (125) 
The rooms and the body temperatures replace the conventional frames of por· 
traitures - moving targets replacing fixed ones. The Suffocation Rooms involves 
portraits within portraits. The figure in the box works like a stand-in for all por· 
traits and their subjects, while the metamorphs looking on become portraits of 
the art's audience. In that sense, viewers are asked to consider their own iden· 
tities in the act of relating to portraiture, a collective and dynamic act that 
makes everybody involved both a subject and an object. 
The key difference between Burden's art and Rune's lies in their approaches 
to objectification. Rune makes portraits of himself with the intent to objectify ev· 
erybody involved, including himself. As Burden's starving poet lover Bruno ob-
serves, "I thought he looked like a goddamn male model with his rippling abdo· 
men, popping biceps, films of him scratching his ass, picking his nose" (160). As 
the objectifier, though, he gets to be the last remaining subject in a world of ob· 
jects. Burden's collaboration with him is a challenge - to herself as much as to 
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him. She's determined to convince him that identity is dynamic, relational, 
messy, hard to see, lost in feelings, recursive. Early in their relationship, Burden 
buys one of Rune's video portraits, which Bruno describes in one of the sections 
he narrates: 
I'm not sure Harry really liked the thing she bought by Rune - the video screen with faces 
cut to bits and put back together again, a movie mishmash of glamour and gore. It was 
multiple - which meant "not that expensive." One afternoon, I parked myself in front of 
~he screen and gave it a yeoman's try. Let me be fair, I said, and not loaded with prejudice 
iust because. the artist is an asshole. T.S. Eliot was no paragon, was he? Are these bloody 
m~gs and shced cheeks any good? Am I interested? Do I care? To be honest, the damed 
th~ng. stumped me. I told Harry it made me feel lonely, and she laughed, but the she 
said 1t made her lonely, too. It's not about communion. (162) 
It's not about communion. When there is a problem with a portrait in Hustvedt's 
wor~, this is it. ~ommunion is the art of mixing, an antidote to the exploitive po-
~entia~ of portraiture. The climax of Burden's relationship involves a private game 
m w_h1ch the two artists don masks and engage in some gender-switching role 
playi~g - embodied portraits of characters that represent their commingled fan-
tasy hves. Burden loses. She cannot help becoming Rune's object, and in the end 
he steals her work and discredits her as a lunatic. If The Blazing World is a cri· 
tiq~e of the art _wo~ld, its thesis is that too often the art world is interested only in 
ob1ects and obiectification. 
2. Dorian Gray's Grandchildren 
~hen Dorian Gray examines his reflection in Basil Hallward's portrait, seeing 
his own moral and corporeal decay displaced onto the canvas, ekphrasis - a de-
vice that ordinarily freezes time - acquires the momentum of narrative. Dorian 
Gray's painting reverses portraiture's tendency to fix its subjects: 
Hour by ho.ur, and week by week, the thing upon the canvas was growing old. It might es-
cape the hideousness of sin, but the hideousness of age was in store for it. The cheeks 
would become hollo':" or flaccid. Yellow crow's feet would creep round the fading eyes 
and make them hornble. The hair would lose its brightness, the mouth would gape or 
droop, would be foolish or gross, as the mouths of old men are. There would be the wrin· 
kled throat, the cold, blue-veined hands, the twisted body. (Wilde 1989: 99) 
Still beatific, Dorian Gray resists narrative time and maintains his perfection on 
~e surfac~, but the portrait accumulates his experience and is marked by the 
sms he displaces. Ordinarily, portraiture captures a moment of subjectivity 
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while narrative chronicles an indeterminate series of passing moments and feel-
ings. Wilde requires the supernatural to transform conventional portraiture into a 
form that can represent the flux of identity. Hustvedt's artists require only the 
magic of aesthetic innovation. Wilde places Dorian Gray before the canvas to 
read the image of his disintegrating body. Like Iris Vegan, an artist seems to 
have robbed his soul, but unlike Iris's, Dorian's portrait does not circulate. Com-
paratively, this turns out to be worse. With Hustvedt's novels as a clue, it is easy 
to see that Dorian prevents himself from mixing, communing, or relating. He is 
alone with a portrait that documents the hideous evolution of bis primordial 
feelings. 
In his book Portraiture (2004), art historian Richard Brilliant surveys an in-
tellectual history of the portrait - a history that focuses on paradoxes and ten-
sions created when the flux of identity is represented in static forms. Sounding 
a little like Hustvedt, Brilliant observes that "[i]f identity is a flexible concept, 
then defining the relationship between the original and his portrait is surely 
problematic" (59). Hustvedt's portrait artists tend to revel in the flexibility of 
identity - and to various degrees they seek power through manipulating that 
flexibility by exercising control over the relationship between subject and viewer. 
The trick is to deliver the viewer with a moment of flux and to fix the subject in 
that moment. A viewer may wonder about the life that surrounds the subject, but 
the captured moment dominates. 
Brilliant describes portraiture "as a method of packaging individuals in neat 
containers of personhood" (83), but be acknowledges that the particular method 
is never simple and the packages rarely neat: 
Historically, portrait artists have often sought to discover some central core of personhood 
as the proper object of their representation. They have done so not because they doubted its 
existence, as did Klee, but because they wanted to capture, unmistakably, the special qual-
ity or qualities of their subject That invisible core of self was always hard to grasp and even 
harder to portray, so various solutions were invented that would extend the metaphorical 
nature of the portrait in a manner consistent with the subject's own behaviour or patterns 
of self-representation. This mode of portrayal has, as its ruling principle, the presentation of 
the individual in some special, personal capacity, however extreme that might appear. (67) 
Each of Hustvedt's portrait artists deals with the difficulties of grasping "the in-
visible core self" with particular techniques, using various means to shape "the 
metaphorical nature of the portrait" in a way that fulfills a set of drives that re-
veal cracks or gaps in his own flexible identity - though Hustvedt does not pro-
vide a sustained representation of the artists' mental lives, thereby making it im-
possible to do much other than conjecture about what the cracks and gaps 
mean. 
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In. her ~oo~ ~ortraits and Persons, philosopher Cynthia Vreeland describes 
portraiture m similar terms: 
~i:I ~r~~;~~~~· t!ot~e :~~.~:~ ::;i~~~:~~~ ~e :i;~::~~1::!1~:~~:~~~~~~~=t opfhthe 
tea matenal 'ltve' and show s . . ys-
reveals psycholo ical a u a perso~, an actual md1vidual whose physical embodiment 
g wareness, consciousness, and an inner emotional life. (2010: 1) 
In Hustvedt's nov~ls, the alchemists are powerful, because they possess a uni ue 
:ntrol.~';;'r ':"hat IS revealed - or concocted - wUh regard to the relationship ~e­
een P_ ysical embodiment" and "psychological awareness, consciousnes 
~~d an m.ner. emotional life." Building on this idea, Vreeland argues th~~ 
smce antiqmty, portraits have been valued because they f il't t 'th · ac i a e contact 
w1 important persons who are lost to us" (2010· 72- 73) H d ' -d · · ustve t s artists 
~r~ ~~s~o em. :hey are n~t in the business of painting important personages, 
u h ey o associate loss with portraiture. The subject of a portrait will never be 
as s e was when it was painted. 
. Bill's portrait of Violet in What I Loved illustrates the problem of time . 
tra1ture by including multiple figures: m por-
Bill's painting hung alone 0 II 1 . long that sh d n a wa . ~was a large picture, about six feet high and eight feet 
' owe a young woman lymg on the floor in an e 
up on one elbow, and she seemed to be looki t . mpty room. She was propped 
~ng. Bridlliahnt light str~amed into the room fro= t~a~os~d:t~;;h~~on:!:~::di~~~i~a~:da~:~ 
ace an c est. Her nght hand was restin h . 
~:~o~a:a~h;h:;~~~~~i~~ aa~~tl:ot~~ :~et~~:~~::~::t~~~r:n:e~~e; ~f 7:;:~~~~t~~~ 
. ~t took me about a minute to understand that there were actuall thr . ~amtlng'.Far to my right, on the dark side of the canvas, I noticed th~ a ee people·~ the 
~=st~:~·i~:~~~~~:~:~~~::;~~kle cou~d ~e seen inside the frame, i:~7:enl::;eresa~~ 
ing back at it. The invisible woman ::aructatm~ care, and once I had seen it, I kept look-
canvas The th' d me as important as the one who dominated the 
. tr person was only a shadow. For a moment I mistook the shadow for m 
own, but then I understood that the artist had included it in the work The be rf ~ 
;~~:~~:o ::pes ;::;!~nly a mdan's beT-shirt, ~as ~ing looked at by s;meone 0:~s
1
i:e 
' 0 seeme to standing JUSt where I w t di 
!iced the darkness that fell over her belly and her thighs. (2003: 4)as s an ng when I no-
The woma~ leaving ~he frame and the artist's shadow suggest a narrative - and 
therefore time. The hght streaming through the windows and the . . t . s t l · · mmia ure taxi 
ugges a arger milieu. for that narrative. The viewer - in this case the novel's 
narrator - draws attention to the fact that identity implies relationship: "The in-
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visible woman became as important as the one who dominated the canvas." 
Why? Because she is a sign of Violet's relational identity. 
Of course, there is a lot the viewer cannot know. His relation to the figures on 
the canvas involves a fantasy of relating to its subjects. The painter distorts iden-
tity through technique; the viewer grasps for it by looking. What happens to the 
subject of the portrait? That is the question that Hustvedt dramatizes with all her 
fictional portraits. The answers vary. They are a moving target that depends on 
the ethical stance of the artist, the social and psychological position of the sub-
ject, and both their relationships to a history of ideas about mind and body ~ a 
history that is like a canvas for Hustvedt's narratives. Hustvedt's representation 
of characters is focalized by this history of ideas; she puts her own audiences in 
the position of investing emotionally in the lives of characters who embody its 
insights and gaps. Theoretical problems become narrative ones, urgent and em-
bodied in fictional lives. 
A second portrait animates What I Loved, a portrait of Mark as a toddler, 
painted by Bill and later acquired by the villain-artist Teddy Giles: "The little 
boy was laughing madly as he held a lamp shade on top of his head like a 
hat, and he was naked except for a paper diaper so heavy with urine and 
feces that it had sunk low on his hips" (2003: 289). Cryptically, Teddy Giles in-
forms Leo that he has bought the painting "and may use it" (290). Leo is distw-
bed: 
J knew as well as anyone that paintings circulate - move from owner to owner, languish in 
dark rooms, reappear, are sold and resold, stolen, destroyed, restored for better or for 
worse. A painting may resurface anywhere, and yet the sight of that canvas in this place 
appalled me. (290) 
Paintings circulate. They "languish in dark rooms" like Dorian Gray's. They reap-
pear, are stolen and destroyed, like Iris's photograph. Why is Leo appalled? Part-
ly because Mark has grown into a problem - a liar who seems to lack empathy, 
like Teddy Giles. When Teddy repurposes the portrait, he works in a tradition of 
shock art very much like Rune's: 
Teddy Giles used the painting of Mark in his new exhibition. The scandal revolved aro~nd 
the fact that the valuable canvas had been destroyed. A figure of a murdered woman, IIllSS-
ing one arm and a leg, had been pushed through Bill's painting of his son. Her.head pro-
trude through one side of the canvas, choking her at the neck. The rest of her maimed body 
stuck out on the other side. The force of the piece relied on the fact that an original work of 
art, owned by Giles, was now as mutilated as the mannequin. (299) 
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In the art world, the scandal is about the destruction of a valuable work of art. In 
the novel, it is about the artist's willful exploitation of the flux of identity. His 
dark reading of relationality equates it with mutilation. If identity is not fixed, 
there is no self to value. That is the nihilistic reading shared by Hustvedt's vil-
lains. 
Christine Marks emphasizes the "ambivalence of the other's presence" in 
Hustvedt's "conceptualization of vision and visual art" (2014: 68). Marks links 
this ambivalence to Hustvedt's deconstruction of "epistemological certainties at-
tributed to the scopic field" (68). Hustvedt's villains have a way of asserting their 
own vision as a reflection - or successful manipulation - of the realities they 
represent. They deny or mock the ambivalence of their subjects. As Marks argues, 
Hustvedt "highlights how the perception of other people, as a well as the percep-
tion of visual art, reflects identity constellations governed by either intersubjec-
tive exchange or subject-object domination. [ . . . ] Looking at somebody else, the 
individual sees part of herself reflected through the eyes of the other. The look 
can be both an instrument of subjection and a mediator of affirmation" (69). 
When a Teddy Giles or a Rune insists on stamping an image with an imprimatur 
of definitiveness or ownership, he yokes the perception of art and people, he 
makes art "an instrument of subjection." When they do, it is up to the subjects 
to find new, more reciprocal frames to occupy. 
3. Hustvedt's Frames 
Siri Hustvedt has at least one thing in common with Harriet Burden: "The 
woman was chin-deep in the neuroscience of perception, and for some reason 
those unreadable papers with their abstracts and discussions justified her sec-
ond life as a scam artist" (2014: 159). Hustvedt's villain-artists are reductionists, 
an accusation often lobbed at scientists. They believe they fix identity - or rob 
souls. That reductionism is key to Hustvedt's use of portraiture as a means for 
exploring the questions about identity and embodiment that drive her involve-
ment with neuroscience. She draws explicit connections between art and neuro-
science throughout her essay collection Living, Thinking, Looking (2012). In an 
essay entitled "Embodied Visions: What Does It Mean to Look at a Work of 
Art?" she makes her position with regard to neuroscience clear: 
Despite the scientific zeal to atomize experience, to break it down into comprehensible bits 
and pieces, this approach often results in a frozen view of reality. Jn recent years, parts of 
the scientific community have been influenced by the phenomenology of Husserl, and, 
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more important, by Merleau·Ponty, to challenge a paralyzed, purely third-person view of 
perception. (2012: 348) 
Hustvedt's aim, in the multiple genres she writes, goads neuroscience into ac-
counting for first-person subjectivity. Her term "paralyzed" could be adapted 
to describe the portraits of her more nefarious artists, the ones who atomize 
or freeze the experience of their subjects. 
Unlike Burden, Siri Hustvedt does not mask herself with pseudonyms when 
she publishes articles in peer-reviewed science journals - a highly unusual prac-
tice for a contemporary novelist - or engages in public discussion with world-re-
nowned neuroscientists and philosophers like Antonio Damasio, Jaak Panksepp, 
and Ned Block. Instead, she creates new frames for her ideas about relationships 
between mind, body, self, and art. To date, Hustvedt has published three collec-
tions of essays. She has also published three articles in three peer-reviewed neu-
roscience journals: "Three Emotional Stories" in Neuropsychoanalysis, "Philoso-
phy Matters in Brain Matters" in Seizure, and "I Wept for Four Years and When I 
Stopped I Was Blind" in Clinical Neurophysiology. She published a book-length 
essay, The Shaking Woman, or, A History of My Nerves, documenting her own 
neurological anomalies. She has lectured at numerous conferences devoted to 
neuroscience and philosophy, she has made public appearances in dialogue 
with neuroscientists like Damasio and Panksepp, and she engaged in debate 
with philosopher turned cognitive scientist Ned Block in The New York Times. 
In her essays and lectures, Hustvedt translates her narrative preoccupations 
into arguments - and in the process creates new relations between art and sci-
ence. She also establishes new contexts for the ideas she explores in fiction, ere· 
ating for herself an unprecedented position as a novelist who makes direct con-
tributions to debates in theoretical neuroscience. 
Hustvedt articulates her roving investigations of these questions in terms of 
frames in The Shaking Woman: 
Who are we, anyway? What do I actually know about myself? My symptom has taken me 
from the Greeks to the present day, in and out of theories and thoughts that are built on 
various ways of seeing the world. What is body and what is mind? Is each of us a singular 
being or a plural one? How do we remember things and how do we forget them? Tracking 
my pathology turns out to be an adventure in the history of experience and perception. 
How do we read a symptom or an illness? How do we frame what we observe? What is in· 
side the frame and what falls outside it? (2010: 69) 
If the self is a moving target in Hustvedt's work, she inventories some of its 
movements in her extended essay on her own convulsions and migraines. To 
know herself, Hustvedt traces the history of medicine, neuroscientific theory, 
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philosophy, and the representation of gender. The implication is that the self 
cannot be contained within a single frame. 
In an essay published in the journal Neuropsychoanalysis, Hustvedt rehears-
es yet another set of frames - disciplinary ones. She proposes a hypothetical 
novelist, psychoanalyst, and neuroscientist and ventriloquizes their respective 
explanations of the relationship between memory and imagination. For the nov-
elist, "The story does all the work"; "the novel develops an internal logic of its 
own, guided by my feelings"; for the psychoanalyst, memories, fantasies, and 
dreams "exist in a dialogical atmosphere and an abstract conceptual framework. 
[ ... ) What is created between the analyst and patient is not necessarily a story 
that represents historical fact, but one that reconstructs a past into a narrative 
that makes sense of troubling emotions"; for the neuroscientist, "subjective 
memory and creative acts [are) objective categories, which she or he hopes 
will unveil the neurobiological realities of a self that remembers and imagines" 
(2011: 188). If we want to understand phenomena as complex as imagination, 
memory, creativity, or self, we need multiple frames to do it. 
At the end of "Three Emotional Stories," Hustvedt makes an elegant argu-
ment about her craft: "Writing fiction, creating an imaginary world, is, it 
seems, rather like remembering what never happened" (195). Publishing memo-
ries of what never happened is a potentially powerful thing to do. That is where 
ethics come in. By making a career of mixing genres and disciplines, she refuses 
the methodological or epistemological assumptions that tend to be associated 
with the novelist, the psychoanalyst, or the neuroscientist. As Marks argues, 
"Hustvedt [ ... ) promotes a responsibility of the artist in the way in which he or 
she represents the object" (2014: 100). Quoting Hustvedt, she observes that 
"[a) good photographer thus does not simply objectify and control her subject, 
but 'recognizes all that remains unseen"' (101). If Hustvedt's position is a moving 
target, it is because she emulates that good photographer. She dramatizes "all 
that remains unseen" in her novels, but she also engages with contemporary 
neuroscience and neuroscientists in order to encourage them into recognizing 
the vitality of the unseen in their methods. When the object is the brain, it quick-
ly becomes the self too. So Hustvedt delivers lessons in Merleau-Ponty to the 
world of neuroscience (and the reading public). 
Hustvedt's friend and sometimes collaborator Antonio Damasio argues that 
the feelings of selfhood involve a kind of constant vacillation and mixing of the 
"self-as-subject" and "self-as-object." Of course, mixing is Hustvedt's term, but it 
is an apt description of the concept. The self-as-object is "the material me," a 
"dynamic collection of integrated neural processes, centered on the representation 
of the living body, that finds expression in a dynamic collection of integrated men-
tal processes" (Damasio 2010: 9; emphasis original). The self-as-subject is 
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a more elusive presence, far less collected in mental or biological terms than the me, more 
dispersed, often dissolved in the stream of consciousness, at times so annoyingly subtle 
that it is there but almost not there. The self-as-knower is more difficult to capture than 
the plain me, unquestionably. But that does not diminish its significance for consciousness. 
The self-as-subject-and-knower is not only a very real presence but a turning point in bio-
logical evolution. We can imagine that the self-as-subject-and-knower is stacked, so to 
speak, on top of the self-as-object, as a new layer of neural processes giving rise to yet an-
other layer of mental processing. There is no dichotomy between self-as-object and self-as-
knower; there is, rather, a continuity and a progression. The self-as-knower is grounded on 
the self-as-object. (79) 
In the world of Hustvedt's novels, an ethical portrait is one that provides an aes-
thetic home for the subject-object dynamic that makes the relational self. 
Ironically, the self-as-subject becomes 'there' through its relations - which 
inevitably involves objectification, as we see in the relationships that ensue 
from the portraits Hustvedt's artists create. In the opening of her essay entitled 
"Outside the Mirror," Hustvedt describes herself in terms that recall the frenzied 
dance Iris does for George in order to illustrate the role of the witness in the mak-
ing of identity: 
It is a peculiar truth that I see far less of myself than other people do. I can see my fingers 
typing when I look down at them. I can examine my shoes, the details of a shirt cuff, or 
admire a pair of new tights on my legs while I am sitting down, but the mirror is the 
only place where I am whole to myself. Only then do I see my body as others see it. But 
does my mirror-self really represent my persona in the world? Is that woman who gives her-
self the once-over, who checks for parsley in incisors to avoid a green smile, who leans 
close to study new wrinkles or the red blotches that sometimes appear on her rapidly 
aging countenance a reasonable approximation of what others see? I do not witness myself 
as I talk and gesture emphatically to make absolutely sure my point has been made. I do 
not see myself as I stride down the street, dance, or stumble, nor do I know what I look like 
when I laugh, grimace, cry, or sneer. (2012: 52) 
Hustvedt sees herself in the frame and wonders, "does my mirror-self really rep-
resent my persona in the world?" She makes an object of herself, but it is not the 
object others make of her. She studies new wrinkles and red blotches on her 
face, like Dorian Gray gazing at his portrait. She can never witness the dancing, 
stumbling, laughing, or grimacing others see. If, like Dorian Gray, she were to sit 
for a portrait, she would see the inexorable flux of her identity fixed at a partic-
ular moment, as seen from the particular point of view of the artist. She would 
see a portrait that objectifies her, but also one that gives aesthetic form to her 
relationship with the artist and viewers' relationships with the portrait. She 
would see a fixed representation haunted by the elusive and dense relations 
that make identity. 
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4. Final Frame 
!
"ti thakve come home to die, but dying is not so simple in this our twenty-first-century world 
a es a team." · 
- Harriet Burden, The Blazing World 
~;e~/~tumn Pinkney, the new age metaphysical dualist, has the last word in 
.e. ~ng ~orld - and her last word frames Hustvedt's preoccupation with 
mJ.Xmg m a voice that is unlike any other to appear in her fiction: 
Aura~ are. like magnets. They pick up all kinds of crap, and mine was getting muc from 
thedv1bra~ons and negative energies. I was running my hands through my hair all t~ t' 
an washing up washing u s . 1, 1me ' p. omet1mes d go outside and walk and let the wind from th 
water blow over me and clean me. (Hustvedt 2014: 97) e 
The gesture. is not ironic. Harriet is dying, and Sweet Autumn Pinkney's arrival -
new age phllosophies and all - provides the solace she cannot seem to find from 
anybody else on the team that marshals her death. With Sweet Autumn Pinkney, 
~ustvedt adds yet another frame to her exploration of self. If the novelist finds it 
~n story, the psy~hoanalyst in memory, and the neurobiologist in physiology, 
weet A~tumn Pmkney finds it everywhere. She uses new age language to ex-
press an idea that suffuses Hustvedt's fiction, from The Blindfold to Th Bl . 
World: Identity i~ relational, but its relations can be dangerous. Her ;tist~~! 
measured by their ethical responses to the danger In the hands of a G 
a T dd G"l - . · eorge or 
e_ y I .es or .a Rune, subjects become objects with little recourse to the dy-
~a':11c relationship between objectivity and subjectivity necessary for a person to 
~ve._ In the ~ands of a Harriet Burden, we all become subjects on the verge of 
abjection. But m the hands of a Sweet Autumn p· kn 
case, it takes a team - . . . m ey, we are magnets. In each 
. . not Just to die, but to hve. Relationships constitute iden-
~ty. How, they do it has e~erything to do with the ethics of those involved. In Siri 
u~tve~t s wor~, portraits are vehicles for exploring the dynamics of objectifi-
cati?n involved m being human, and frames become symbols for the ethical 
choices confronted by an artist attuned to those dynamics. 
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Klaus Losch and Heike Paul 
Dimensions of Tacit Knowledge and the 
Art(s) of Explication in Siri Hustvedt's Work 
1. Introduction 
Siri Hustvedt's fictional and non-fictional works circle around the themes of (fe-
male) subjectivity and creativity as they are of central relevance to art and aes-
thetic experience, psychoanalysis, history, and memory. Exploring these broad 
and complex topics, Hustvedt eclectically engages with texts from a large (and 
rather male-dominated) canon of Western philosophy and literature in order 
to point out argumentative fault lines, ambiguities, and (gender) biases along 
the way and to create new stories in the interstices opened up by these maneu-
vers. Her (re)formulations of old but still pertinent questions relate to notions of 
the (autonomous) self, the workings of the psyche, the problem of intersubjectiv-
ity, and the role of the imagination. This essay seeks to identify dimensions of 
tacit knowledge in Hustvedt's writings in order to analyze her work in the 
wider multidisciplinary framework of critical approaches to knowledge produc-
tion, and, in tum, to probe the gender-specific aspect of tacit knowledge which 
appears to be often neglected in recent scholarship. We will single out three dif-
ferent texts in order to focus on three different ways in which the tacit dimension 
(to use the title of Michael Polanyi's well-known work (1966]) of knowing is 'pre-
sentified' in her writings.1 'Presentifying' here means to make the tacit/implicit 
partially explicit and thus to make it tentatively accessible (but not easily grasp-
able or comprehensible) in language; the concept of the tacit dimension of know-
ing thus allows for the discussion of divergent topics and effects of such implicit-
ness. First, in her non-fictional account The Shaking Woman, or, A History of My 
Nerves (2009), which may be classified as life writing and has been called a 
"neuro-memoir" (Boyers 2014) and in some of her personal essays collected in 
Living, Thinking, Looking (2012), Siri Hustvedt looks at conceptualizations of sub-
jectivity and the embodied subject specifically in terms of 'saneness' vs. pathol-
1 The Erlanger research program on "presence and tacit knowledge" funded by the German 
research foundation is the institutional context for this essay. The program is dedicated to 
analyses of (culturally specific) phenomena of presence and their interdependency with forms of 
tacit knowledge. The latter is understood in light of a repertoire of theories and perspectives in 
the sociology of knowledge and the philosophy of knowledge ranging from Gilbert Ryle, Karl 
Mannheim, and Michael Polanyi to Alexis Shotwell and Alva Noe. 
